Journals

Introduction

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9774-7
• Authors
  • Johan van Benthem, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
  • Theo Kuipers, Groningen, The Netherlands
  • Henk Visser, Maastricht, The Netherlands

• Journal Synthese
• Online ISSN 1573-0964
• Print ISSN 0039-7857

Abstract  Both the Beth definability theorem and Craig’s lemma (interpolation theorem from now on) deal with the issue of the entanglement of one language L 1 with another language L 2, that is to say, information transfer—or the lack of such transfer—between the two languages. The notion of splitting we study below looks into this issue. We briefly relate our own results in this area as well as the results of other researchers like Kourousias and Makinson, and Peppas, Chopra and Foo. Section 3 does contain one apparently new theorem.

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9778-3
• Authors
  • Rohit Parikh, Brooklyn College of CUNY, Brooklyn, NY USA

• Journal Synthese
• Online ISSN 1573-0964
• Print ISSN 0039-7857

Responses to Stoljar, Weatherson and Boghossian

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9614-0
• Authors
  • Robert Stalnaker, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, 32-d808, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307, USA

• Journal Philosophical Studies
• Online ISSN 1573-0883
• Print ISSN 0031-8116

Response to critics

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9605-1
• Authors
  • Jack Lyons, Department of Philosophy, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA

• Journal Philosophical Studies
• Online ISSN 1573-0883
• Print ISSN 0031-8116

Précis

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9615-z
• Authors
  • Robert Stalnaker, Department of Linguistics & Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, 32-d808, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307, USA

• Journal Philosophical Studies
• Online ISSN 1573-0883
• Print ISSN 0031-8116

Abstract  This article reconsiders Kripke’s (1977, in: French, Uehling & Wettstein (eds) Contemporary perspectives in the philosophy of language, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis) pragmatic, univocal account of the attributive-referential distinction in terms of a metalinguistic apparatus consisting of semantic reference and speaker reference. It is argued that Kripke’s strongest methodological argument supporting the pragmatic account, the parallel applicability of the apparatus to both names and definite descriptions, is successful only if descriptions are treated as designators in both attributive and referential uses. It is not successful if descriptions are treated à la Russell, contrary to what is often assumed. Thus a third theoretical option for the semantic analysis of definite descriptions arises, neglected by both supporters and opponents of Russell: a univocal, referentialist analysis of descriptions in conjunction with a pragmatic account of the attributive-referential distinction. Contrary to Kripke, and to much of the literature, it is noted that not all so-called referential uses involve implicatures. In the course of the argument Kripke’s innovative apparatus is subjected to improvements and fine-tunings. Also, some general critical comments are made about analogical reasoning, on which Kripke’s argument is partly based. This leads to a clarification of the fundamental notion of speaker reference. The paper concludes with reflections on the challenge to and need of systematic empirical evidence in this field, a desideratum noted by Kripke and still not met.

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9608-y
• Authors
  • Edward Kanterian, Trinity College, Oxford University, Oxford, OX1 3BH UK

• Journal Philosophical Studies
• Online ISSN 1573-0883
• Print ISSN 0031-8116

Precis of perception and basic beliefs

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9606-0
• Authors
  • Jack Lyons, Department of Philosophy, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA

• Journal Philosophical Studies
• Online ISSN 1573-0883
• Print ISSN 0031-8116

Abstract  More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these norms are not problematic in the way critics have suggested they would be. In particular, these norms do not guide thinking by motivating intentional agents to (intentionally) accord with them; as a result, no obvious vicious regress threatens the theory. In the final section of this paper, I argue that accepting this teleological theory of intentionality need not commit one to thinking that intentionality is the product of natural selection.

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9610-4
• Authors
  • Benjamin W. Jarvis, School of Politics, International Studies, and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast, 21 University Square, Belfast, BT7 1PA UK

• Journal Philosophical Studies
• Online ISSN 1573-0883
• Print ISSN 0031-8116

Abstract  This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multiple-conclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a proof-theoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multiple-conclusion systems are ill-suited for this purpose because they fail to provide a ‘natural’ representation of our ordinary modes of inference. Moreover, the two most plausible attempts at bringing multiple conclusions into line with our ordinary forms of reasoning, the disjunctive reading and the bilateralist denial interpretation, are unacceptable by inferentialist standards.

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s10992-010-9153-3
• Authors
  • Florian Steinberger, Queens’ College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB3 9ET UK

• Journal Journal of Philosophical Logic
• Online ISSN 1573-0433
• Print ISSN 0022-3611

Abstract  The principle of indifference (hereafter ‘Poi’) says that if one has no more reason to believe A than B (and vice versa), then one ought not to believe A more than B (nor vice versa). Many think it’s demonstrably false despite its intuitive plausibility, because of a particular style of thought experiment that generates counterexamples. Roger White (2008) defends Poi by arguing that its antecedent is false in these thought experiments. Like White I believe Poi, but I find his defense unsatisfactory for two reasons: it appeals to false premises, and it saves Poi only at the expense of something that Poi’s believers likely find just as important. So in this essay I defend Poi by arguing that its antecedent does hold in the relevant thought experiments, and that the further propositions needed to reject Poi are false. I play only defense in this essay; I don’t argue that Poi is true (even though I think it is), but rather that one popular refutation is faulty. In showing this, I also note something that has to my knowledge gone unnoticed: given some innocuous-looking assumptions the denial of Poi is equivalent to a version of epistemic permissivism, and Poi itself is equivalent to a version of epistemic uniqueness.

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s10992-010-9147-1
• Authors
  • Greg Novack, Wayne State University, 5057 Woodward Ave, Detroit, Michigan 48202, USA

• Journal Journal of Philosophical Logic
• Online ISSN 1573-0433
• Print ISSN 0022-3611

Abstract  The traditional way of thinking about science goes back to the corpuscular philosophy with its micro-reductive mechanism and metaphor of reading God’s Book of Nature. This “story-1” with its rhetoric of exact truths contrasts with “story-2” which describes science as a continuation of the always imperfect powers of representation given to us by evolution. On story-2 reduction is one among other knowledge fashioning strategies and shares the imperfections of all human knowledge. When we appreciate that human knowledge always admits of refinement, what appear as “emergent properties” no long seems mysterious.

• Content Type Journal Article
• DOI 10.1007/s10670-010-9240-4
• Authors
  • Paul Teller, University of California, Davis, CA USA

• Journal Erkenntnis
• Online ISSN 1572-8420
• Print ISSN 0165-0106