Podcast Symposium

Disposition-ascriptions are claims such as ‘the glass is fragile’, ‘you are irascible’, ‘that substance is poisonous’, and so on. ‘Fragile’, ‘irascible’ and ‘poisonous’ seem to tell us something about how the object is disposed to behave in certain circumstances. For instance, a fragile glass is disposed to break, an irascible person is disposed to get angry, and a poisonous substance is disposed to kill.

The full podcast of Simona's paper is here: http://www.bppa-online.org/sites/bppa-online.org/files/symposium/Aimar.mp3

A pdf version of Simona's paper is here: http://www.bppa-online.org/sites/bppa-online.org/files/symposium/Aimar.pdf

See the comments for Professor Barbara Vetter's response

This paper has two objectives. By addressing its principle concern, the secondary concern can be considered and taken up and partially resolved for my immediate purposes. Firstly, the essay demonstrates the gulf between the analytic and continental approaches to philosophy in general. This divide is made evident by exploring Michael Clark’s understanding of humour and incongruity in his 1970 essay of that title. This essay attracted responses from Roger Scruton and Michael W. Martin, each taking issue with Clark’s interpretation in a different way. These divergences each indicate a different mode of access to the topic of humour, and in this regard, I specify the ways in which they can be seen as distinctively ‘analytic’ or ‘continental’. Through examining Clark’s thesis and its attendant antitheses, we are able to identify the process by which these two approaches can be mutually beneficial for settling certain issues.

The full podcast of Shelley's paper is here: http://www.bppa-online.org/sites/bppa-online.org/files/symposium/humour.mp3

A pdf version of Shelley's paper is here: http://www.bppa-online.org/sites/bppa-online.org/files/symposium/humour.pdf

See the comments for Roxanna Lynch's response.

It is often claimed that it is part of the essence of propositions that they have their representational properties intrinsically. In this paper I sketch an account of the nature of propositions according to which this is not the case. I then show how the proponent of such a view can respond to two pressing objections.

The full podcast of Thomas's paper is here: http://www.bppa-online.org/sites/bppa-online.org/files/symposium/hodgson.mp3

A pdf version of Thomas's paper is here: http://www.bppa-online.org/sites/bppa-online.org/files/symposium/hodgson.pdf

See the comments for Scott Normand's response.

Findings from the burgeoning study of subjective well-being (SWB) are both interesting and important in terms of their relation to well-being simpliciter. For this reason, the study of SWB is beginning to attract the attention of the media, laypersons and public policy practitioners. However, the ways in which SWB findings are normatively important are controversial and unclear. This is not a good situation for the study of SWB; in order for such findings to be used effectively, the study of SWB needs a normative framework that most people can agree on.

In this paper, I show that attempts to find an essential relationship between SWB and well-being simpliciter have not as yet been successful (in terms of being generally accepted), but to pursue this debate may mask the areas in which there is general agreement. It may be more helpful (both to an eventually accepted theory and to laypersons and policymakers in the meantime) to start with uncontroversial relationships between SWB and well-being simpliciter. I outline three contingent significant relationships between SWB and well-being simpliciter, which all people can agree on. Together, these three relationships should form the normative framework for the study of subjective well-being.

The full podcast of Sam's paper is here: http://www.bppa-online.org/sites/bppa-online.org/files/symposium/swl-pod...

A pdf version of Sam's paper is here: http://www.bppa-online.org/sites/bppa-online.org/files/symposium/swl-Apr...

See the comments for Guy Fletcher's response

I'm glad to announce the beginning of the Spring 2012 BPA Podcast Symposium. The schedule for the podcast symposium is as follows:

April 5th:

Sam Wren-Lewis (University of Leeds), 'Towards a Normative Framework for the Study of Subjective Well-Being.'

Response: Dr Guy Fletcher (University of Edinburgh)

April 12th:

Thomas Hodgson (University of St Andrews), 'Propositions Need Not be Intrinsically Representational.'

Response: Scott Normand (University of Reading).

April 19th:

Shelley Campbell (University of Gloucestershire), 'If P, so why not Q? Philosophy of Humour in the two traditions.'

Response: Roxanna Lynch (Birkbeck College and University of Swansea)

April 26th:

Simona Aimar (University of Oxford), 'How to Account for Disposition Ascriptions.'

Response: Dr Barbara Vetter (Humboldt University of Berlin)